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Emergent Failures: Rethinking Cloud 
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Since the conception of Cloud computing, ensuring its ability to provide 
highly reliable service has been of the upmost importance and criticality 
to the business objectives of providers and their customers. This has held 
true for every facet within the system, encompassing applications, 
resource management, the underlying computing infrastructure, and 
environmental cooling. Thus, the Cloud computing and dependability 
research communities have exerted considerable efforts towards 
enhancing the reliability of system components against various software 
and hardware failures. However, as these systems have continued to 
grow in scale, heterogeneity and complexity resulting in the 
manifestation of emergent behaviour, so too have their respective 
failures. Recent studies of production Cloud datacenters indicate the 
existence of complex failure manifestation which existing fault tolerance 
and recovery strategies are ill-equipped to effectively handle and can 
even be responsible for such failures themselves. These emergent failures 
– frequently transient and only identifiable at run-time – represent a 
significant threat towards designing reliable Cloud systems. This work 
identifies the challenges of emergent failures within Cloud datacenters at 
scale, their impact upon system resource management, and discusses 





By 2020, the first centralized Exascale system will be 
created, comprising hundreds of thousands of nodes that 
provisions enormous quantities of computational and 
storage capability. Modern Cloud datacenter operation is 
characterized by growing system scale and diversity 
within workload usage patterns, resource utilization, and 
application types. Such behaviour subsequently results in 
diverse fault activation producing failures strongly 
influenced by user and task behaviour, resource type, 
workload intensity [1], and environmental factors 
(temperature, humidity, power). 
As modern Cloud datacentres have continued to grow in 
scale and complexity, failures have become the norm, 
and not the exception. Studies of very large-scale 
computing systems spanning Cloud datacenters, 
supercomputers, HPC, and clusters have demonstrated 
that 4-11% of all tasks fail [1][2][3] stemming from 
diverse sources of faults in software and hardware. This 
has resulted in the creation of a myriad of fault tolerance 
and recovery strategies focused on enhancing the 
availability and reliability of datacenter components 
including jobs and tasks, the resource manager, physical 
nodes, storage, networking, and facility cooling. 
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Moreover, this has resulted in Cloud datacenter 
operation manifesting emergent behaviour – resultant 
system behaviour and operation unforeseen at design 
time. Empirical study of large-scale computing systems 
have indicated that such emergent behaviour has also 
resulted in failure manifestation that is increasingly 
complex and potentially transient in nature stemming 
from correlated fault activation types [1]-[4]. These 
failures type – which we term emergent failures – are 
difficult to address as they represent “known unknown” 
and “unknown unknown” phenomena identified at 
system run-time and are oftentimes difficult to reproduce. 
This is a key challenge as assumptions that underpin 
designing reliable systems are defined at design time and 
are unable to adequately handle constantly changing 
error confinement boundaries and failure scenarios 
driven by the evolution and dynamicity of Cloud 
datacenter operation. These failures impact all aspects of 
system operation from scheduling and instrumentation, 
workload execution, and even the fundamental 
assumptions that define failure propagation boundaries 
of components. 
In this work, we discuss the nature of these emergent 
failures within Cloud datacenters and their impact upon 
resource management. Moreover, we outline potential 
areas that need to be addressed and future directions for 
Cloud reliability research to address emergent failures. 
Emergent Failure Fundamentals 
The Evolution of Cloud Failures 
For many decades within computer science, the creation 
of a computer system has been achieved by defining its 
function and behaviour (i.e. architecture, component 
interaction, and operational assumptions) at design time 
known as the development phase within the 
dependability community [5]. Such an approach is wholly 
intuitive – to create a desired system, it is necessary to 
first explicitly define its respective behaviour to 
implement appropriate mechanisms ensuring its 
dependability. Within the context of reliability, systems 
are defined via expert analysis and specification of 
assumptions pertaining to fault and failure types, error 
propagation across components and system boundaries, 
necessary fault tolerance and recovery strategies, as well 
as their respective coverage required to effectively 
address selected failures. Due to the potential impact 
upon system performance and cost, it is often considered 
viable to only consider a limited scope of fault types and 
failure coverage due to diminishing returns in fault 
prevention (e.g. a system designer can decide not to 
commit considerable engineering effort to tolerate 
incredibly rare yet minor failures). Such an approach is 
driven by the need to reduce the complexity of system 
design and to localise error recovery. 
When failures do manifest outside the confines of a set 
of defined assumptions, maintenance is required to 
conduct system repair and modification to address the 
fault root-cause. Within Cloud datacenters like any other 
complex system, it is inevitable that it is not possible to 
cover all types of faults and failures that may potentially 
manifest. However, present day and future Cloud 
datacenters are frequently exposed to conditions and 
scenarios that result in a large variety of faults and failure 
scenarios which are not envisioned at design time: 
Dynamicity & Heterogeneity. There exists a positive 
correlation between workload resource type, workload 
intensity, and failure rate [1]. As workload dynamicity is 
an intrinsic property of Cloud computing, it is difficult to 
forecast the precise conditions that precipitate failure. 
Such dynamicity is not solely limited to workload, but 
encompasses server power consumption, network traffic, 
and environmental conditions (e.g. temperature 
hotspots). This problem becomes compounded when 
these factors are combined; workload can execute within 
a diverse range of server architectures (refreshed by a 
datacenter approximately every nine months), 
microprocessor types (CPU, GPU, NPU, etc.), network 
configurations, and cooling technologies (air or liquid). 
While such heterogeneity is advantageous for Cloud 
datacenters to offer a variety of services whilst 
minimizing likelihood of common-mode failure, it does so 
at the expense of increasing its exposure to different fault 
types and component interactions that the system is not 
originally designed for. 
Scale & Complexity. Cloud datacenters operating at 
massive-scale are exposed to more frequent and complex 
failure scenarios. Due to an increase in potential system 
states and complexity in component interactions, it can 
be difficult to ascertain the precise root-cause of failure 
manifestation and its dependencies with components 
across the system. Datacenter operators frequently 
encounter scenarios whereby hundreds of failure event 
notifications from different components are eventually 
traced to a root-cause within a seemingly non-related 
component event. Moreover, a system with a greater 
number of components intuitively experiences higher 
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failure frequency. If assuming identical Mean Time 
Between Failure (MTBF) of components, a 10,000 node 
datacenter will encounter more frequent component 
failures in comparison to a 1,000 node datacenter. 
That is not to say that these conditions alone have 
resulted in highly unreliable systems – if that were the 
case existing Cloud datacenters would not operate. 
However, it is indicative of two growing trends within 
large-scale systems that directly threaten their reliability. 
First, as Cloud datacenters continue to evolve in terms of 
their scale, dynamicity, heterogeneity and complexity, 
the manifestation of emergent failures has also increased. 
Second, it is increasingly challenging to ensure system 
reliability when human-defined design assumptions for 
fault types, propagation, as well as fault tolerance and 
recovery strategies may not be appropriate for the 
current operational conditions of the Cloud datacenter. 
Potential Causes of Emergent Failures 
Emergent failures are types of failure characterized by 
their manifestation within constantly changing error 
propagation boundaries intersecting hardware and 
software components, their potential to be transient, and 
are only identifiable at system run-time. There exist 
various examples of emergent failure phenomena in 
large-scale Cloud datacenters, with their effects ranging 
from minor system degradation to catastrophic facility 
outage. 
Performance Interference. Virtualisation encapsulates 
functionality to construct well-defined fault assumptions 
for Virtual Machines (VMs). However, VMs in multi-
tenant servers transparently share the same underlying 
resources. This results in performance interference 
between VMs and daemon processes within the server, 
increasing late-timing failure likelihood for interactive 
tasks. The challenge is that such phenomena varies 
considerably based on workload and hardware 
heterogeneity, and that VMs are not designed to mitigate 
effects outside of their operational boundaries. 
Stragglers. Also known as tailing behaviour whereby a 
subset of a job executes abnormally slower compared to 
typical tasks [4], resulting in late-timing failures for any 
jobs that enforce time-related SLAs. It has been 
demonstrated that 5% of task stragglers impact over half 
of the jobs within a datacentre [3]. Understanding and 
mitigating stragglers is an open challenge in the 
distributed systems community pertaining to detection 
and forecasting due to their transient nature and 
manifestation stemming from a wide variety of potential 
sources from daemon processes, data skew, resource 
contention, component failure, server hotspots, energy 
management, and a combination of any of these causes 
together. 
‘Competing’ Fault Tolerance. Fault tolerance is designed 
assuming defined layers of abstraction between 
components. For example, a sub-system comprising 
multiple components (such as a VM containing an OS) can 
activate a particular fault tolerant strategy to ensure 
service adheres to specified availability and reliability 
requirements. However, as these are created 
independently from other system components, the fault 
tolerance strategy for one sub-system can unknowingly 
impact the service of components outside its operational 
boundary. Creating a VM replica can result in increased 
performance interference and stragglers within other 
VMs, or increase server temperature resulting in a 
hotspot requiring task eviction, and so on.   
Cascading Recovery. Ironically, recovery strategies 
within Cloud datacenters can also result in emergent 
failure manifestation. A well-documented case study of 
such failures is the Amazon 2017 outage. This outage was 
resultant of S3 experiencing substantial growth over the 
past few years, whereby the process of restarting S3 
services and running safety checks to validate metadata 
integrity took longer than expected. Such delays resulted 
in unintended failure cascade between recovery 
strategies as other AWS services impacted by this event 
also began recovering, and these services accumulated a 
backlog of work during S3 disruption that themselves 
required additional time to recover. The scale of this 
problem has been identified by The Argonne National 
Laboratory stating that such an outage demonstrated 
that interdependencies between datacenter and network 
providers are not well understood, and further 
compounds the challenge of creating resilient 
infrastructure. 
Emergent failures can also stem from hardware and 
software reasons including but not limited to: channel 
overloading, power shortage, incorrect kernel caching, 
unpredictably invalid memory access due to 
wild/dangling pointers, unexpected race conditions 
within concurrent threads, kernel or human-made bugs, 
incorrect configurations and so forth. The key principle 
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idea underpinning these failures is that they are a by-
product of emergent operational behaviour  
unanticipated at system design. 
Existing fault tolerance and recovery mechanisms are 
unable to alter their operation and coverage in response 
to any of these causes within Cloud datacenters without 
manual intervention after failure occurrence. Thus, 
emergent failures are frequently omitted from the 
majority of fault tolerance and fault recovery design due 
to their complexity. However, these types of failures will 
become more prominent as Cloud datacenters grow in 
scale and complexity and become even greater with a rise 
IoT and Fog computing prominence.  
Emergent Failures in Resource Management 
Resource management is a fundamental aspect of Cloud 
datacenter operation facilitated by deployment of a 
resource manager (Kubernetes, Borg, Fuxi, YARN, Mesos, 
etc.) that orchestrates machine resources and monitors 
execution of jobs and tasks. Modern Cloud datacenters 
attempt to ensure that all submitted jobs are successfully 
scheduled (in reality, 99.999%), executed, and completed 
without loss of correct service perceivable by the 
customer. The resource scheduler attempts to achieve 
this by monitoring machine health, finding available 
resources for pending tasks, deploying binaries and 
launching workload, restart failed jobs and restore state 
during failover.  
Specifically, failures within resource managers are 
predominately the result of (i) time-outs caused by the 
overall latency aggregated from different service calls for 
jobs (i.e. interactive jobs that experience slowdown and 
have a timing SLA imposed), and (ii) components hanging 
or crashing due to resource exhaustion (i.e. faulty service 
or component results in insufficient resources for regular 
request handling of other tasks). The challenge is that 
these causes are increasingly the result of emergent 
failures. As shown within Fig. 1, Resource managers are 
required to provide resources (compute, storage and 
network) to increasingly various levels of abstractions 
(VMs, containers, batch jobs, object storage, etc.) within 
large-scale dynamic Cloud datacenter environments, thus 
making it difficult to capture failures which transcend 
established component boundaries. 
We discuss three different perspectives as to how 
emergent failures affect resource management, as well 
 
Figure 1. Emergent failure manifestation in Cloud datacenter resource management 
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as how to alleviate their effects: architectural 
factorisation to isolate failures and reduce their 
propagation, runtime monitoring to timely detect 
anomaly behaviour, and instrumentation for proactive 
prevention and tolerance. 
Containerized Architecture Rethinking 
Architectural evolution. The centralized resource 
manager architecture [6-10] is a monolithic system which 
contains all functional components (request handler and 
dispatcher, communication messenger, state manager, 
and decision maker, etc.) contained within single or 
multiple processes. Although decentralized scheduling 
[11][14] can dispatch such functionality to distributed 
components in a loose-coupled manner, they are still 
logically monolithic from the holistic view. There is an 
increasing likelihood that emergent failures manifest 
from memory exhaustion (due to faulty components) 
resulting in the overall crash and stop, unsolved deadlock 
in the decision maker resulting in the slowdown of 
request handling, and late-timing state mismatch in the 
state manager leading to the scheduling conflicts.  
As a result, there has been a need to leverage sub-
modulization and containerization of the datacenter 
resource manager. For example, the resource manager 
master scheduler should be able to function in the face of 
various failures. To orchestrate and run containers, other 
system components such as container clustering, 
networking, and automated deployment and monitoring 
are required. For instance, Kubernetes schedules any 
number of container replicas across a group of nodes. To 
benefit from containerization and increase the 
management flexibility, increasing Kubernetes 
components or external plugins are deployed and 
maintained within containers.   
Fault isolation and propagation prevention. Resource 
exhaustion [12] is a leading root-cause of crash-stop or 
timing failures within system components, and can be 
derived from either failure within a singular component 
or influence from other faulty and non-faulty component 
behaviour outside of its defined system boundaries. For 
example, a service that experiences high latency (due to 
stragglers or crash failures within the network) can result 
in communicating services experiencing resource 
exhaustion. Performance interference between tasks in 
the same physical node results in performance 
degradation and resource exhaustion within other tasks. 
System designers attempt to mitigate such propagation 
via leveraging container-based mechanisms and cgroup 
restriction whose operation is dictated by quantitative 
QoS modelling to define the conservatively least resource 
boundary of each job group. However, determining the 
most appropriate parameters (and importantly, how they 
should evolve in response to changes in operational 
context) is an open research challenge.  
Cloud Monitoring - Timely Detection and 
Alerting 
Robust monitoring and alerting. At increased system 
scale, real-time health-checking, load measurement 
throughput, and application-specific errors become 
increasingly important. However, an outstanding issue is 
how to effectively monitor system health when 
considering the sheer volume and variety of hundreds of 
millions of potential system metrics. When exposed to 
the manifestation of emergent failures that can be 
caused by monitoring itself, traditional static threshold-
based monitoring and alerting are insufficient. A human-
defined threshold may be useful to enact automated 
decision making and alerting on-call technical staff, 
however it may encounter difficulties in terms of false 
negatives and false positives that may change in response 
to system usage. Therefore, a robust anomaly detection 
mechanism whose sensitivity can be appropriately tuned 
in accordance with the current operational context of the 
system is required. A potential means to achieve this is 
leveraging adaptive learning of monitoring and detection 
parameters which considers different periodicity, 
parameter types, and parameter values.  However how 
to generate and exploit streaming metrics to recognise 
outliers is intricately challenging due to the dilemma 
system monitors face - selective use of partial metrics to 
enact fast (yet imprecise) decisions or exploit a large 
amount of metrics for more precise (yet slow) decision 
making.  
Preventive performance diagnosis. In contrast to 
reactive solutions whereby a faulty running service is 
halted to ascertain what conditions led to emergent 
failures manifestation to enact necessary maintenance 
(which has been demonstrated to be ineffective for 
dealing with stragglers [4]), a proactive diagnosis would 
ensure that end-user service is minimally affected. 
Monitoring as many components as possible is likely to 
support failure prediction. However, in practise not all 
components can be monitored due to the sheer volume 
of data required to be collected, transmitted, and 
calculated. Information pertaining to hardware and 
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environmental factors such as fan speed or temperature, 
it is highly desirable to explore the failure root causes and 
investigate the interactions of system components in 
failures caused by multiple faults. However, it is 
extremely difficult to articulate the root causes at 
runtime due to uncontrollable and intrinsic system 
factors. Statistical correlation among metrics can 
facilitate rapidly finding root causes and determining the 
most effective handler. 
Component self-diagnosis is also beneficial to the system 
instrumentation. For example, understanding and 
leveraging node performance is critical for straggler 
mitigation and workload placement. Performance refers 
to its ability to execute parallel applications and hold 
containerized services. Machine learning techniques such 
as classification and regression (e.g. Random Forest, 
Gradient Boosting Trees) might be one means to achieve 
this; through classifying nodes into different categories 
and predicting the corresponding performance category 
with high accuracy, the scheduler can rank nodes and 
select suitable nodes to launch latency-sensitive tasks, 
avoid assigning speculative tasks onto nodes that are 
likely to be in their weak performance state as soon as 
possible. 
Cloud Scheduling and Instrumentation: 
Prevention and Tolerance  
Emergent failure-aware design should be permeated into 
each step and component in the Cloud scheduler. To 
reduce the scheduling downtime, the system should not 
have a single point of failure in the design. The ultimate 
vision is to realize a zero-downtime scheduler system. 
Latency-oriented tail mitigation based on redundancy. 
Modern cluster schedulers must deal with both latency-
sensitive requests and computation intensive tasks (e.g. 
long-running HTTP services, periodic cron jobs).   
Redundancy is the fundamental technique used to 
enhance component reliability of hardware, software and 
data storage. Based on the multi-replica component 
deployment, identical components can be deployed.  The 
replication controller is typically used to track and record 
the health status of replicated components. The 
controller should guarantee the provisioned replica 
number at any given moment.  Namely, the controller 
should launch a new replica if a component is killed or 
becomes inaccessible. For instance, in Kubernetes, the 
Replication Controller can auto-scale and manage 
microservices based on resource utilization or a fixed 
lower or upper limitations of expected replica number. 
For computation intensive tasks, the most common 
means to resolve the straggler is the speculative 
execution relying on the idempotency. However, a lack of 
coordinated fault tolerance between components leads 
to an emergent failure whereby such an action results in 
increased resource contention, leading to cascading 
latencies for new tasks. Stragglers even rise more 
frequently in learning systems and distributed 
optimization due to the fact that performance is 
significantly throttled by slow communications and 
computations. The idempotency is invalid due to the 
shared states. Machine learning scenario-specific 
mitigations such as data encoding with built-in 
redundancy in certain linear computation steps [15] 
enable the system to complete computation to tolerate 
the effects of stragglers. 
User-transparent failover and fault conversion. The 
system designer attempts to design the resource 
scheduler so that it can perform failover and self-healing 
(i.e. autonomous recovery) of all components 
unperceived by the customer. An important 
consideration for conducting failover is state recovery 
that prominently leverages caching or checkpointing. 
Intermediate states or returned results from stateless 
services can be cached so that the majority of services can 
continue operating during intermittent failures within 
any related components. For more critical data or state 
(such as runtime memory bitmap and register values), 
checkpointing can be leveraged to create snapshot 
backups of current system states. While this strategy is 
effective for recovering from incorrect state and data loss, 
the checkpointing itself is often considerably large. 
Checkpointing within a 1,000 node datacenter cluster in 
Alibaba over 24 hours has been reported to generate 
1.7GB checkpoint (and within HPC, checkpointing can 
take hours to complete), and as demonstrated by the 
2017 Amazon outage, can unknowingly manifest as an 
emergent failure itself. Therefore, we believe that new 
approaches are required for checkpointing to function at 
scale such as combining hard state backup and soft-state 
inference [13].However,  due to the fact that emergent 
failures cannot be anticipated beforehand, it is essential 
to enable the finite-state-machine (FSM) of system faults 
to be more able to adapt in accordance to detected 
system faults. For example, this could be conducted by an 
automatic transformation of an emergent fault mode 
into that of a known fault mode classification which can 
then accordingly tackle faults by via established 
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approaches. Once a fault is deterministic, the component 
or devices (such as storage block, NICs) that lead to 
performance degradation could be temporarily isolated 
or removed during system failover.     
Rethinking Beyond Clouds 
Holistic fault tolerance & recovery. Holistic Fault 
Tolerance (HFT) has been recently introduced that could 
potentially be an effective approach for handling 
emergent failures. HFT relies on cross-cutting 
components for system recovery tailored to specific error 
detected and the appropriate recovery strategy for 
execution. The recovery region strictly involves system 
components that need to be involved for recovery for a 
given error. These components, which could be located 
at different layers, subsystems, packages, nodes, etc., are 
involved in a coordinated recovery. This HFT approach 
makes it possible to reduce the system complexity to 
address complex failure recovery scenarios. 
For example, in order to address the challenges with 
performance interference, it could be possible to 
coordinate VMs on the same physical node. In the event 
where a VM is failing to adhere to timing requirements. 
The HFT could then consider performing coordinate 
recovery by leveraging components within both VMs. 
This could be facilitated by the hypervisor altering its 
scheduling to provide more CPU to a particular VM, and 
then measures the resultant delays in both to ensure 
satisfactory levels of CPU share. If they are unable to do 
so, the hypervisor itself would then need to make this 
change. If this is not possible, then a wider decision to 
evict and reschedule the VM is required that then 
incorporates the resource manager. 
IoT integration. The presence of emergent failures is not 
solely confined to Cloud datacenters, and can 
prominently manifest within any large-scale computing 
system. IoT is such a system particularly susceptible to 
emergent failures for many of the reasons given for Cloud 
– dynamic and unpredictable assortment of 
interconnected virtual and physical devices. A key 
difference is IoT exhibits high degree of dynamic join-
leave not found within Cloud computing. If the system 
boundaries of interconnected components are constantly 
changing due to their usage and device composition, it is 
intuitive to assume that imposing rigid fault tolerance 
strategies that are designed independently from the 
operational context of the greater system are 
increasingly infeasible. Such system environments will 
also likely result in ‘fluid’ error confinement areas for a 
set of components, hence we believe a future research 
direction will be investigating how to autonomously 
determine the optimal fault tolerance and recovery 
mechanism for a given system context. 
Conclusion 
In this paper we discuss the rise of emergent failures: a 
growing problem towards ensuring reliability in Cloud 
datacenters and all future computing systems at scale. A 
central issue to address is how to determine effective 
fault tolerance and recovery strategies when 
assumptions that define fault types and failure scenarios 
are constantly changing due to Cloud datacenter 
dynamicity, complexity, and heterogeneity between 
interacting components. Two potential ways to address 
this issue are (i) rethinking the nature of system 
abstraction allowing for holistic fault tolerance that cross-
cuts coordination of components, and (ii) exploring the 
concept pf adaptive fault tolerance in response to current 
and forecasted operational scenarios. Moreover, further 
study is required by the research community to study the 
relationship between Cloud datacenter operation and 
emergent failure manifestation beyond coarse-grain 
analysis and observation, and towards creating models 
which precisely capture system conditions that lead to 
failure. 
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